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1	Humean	reductionism	about	laws	Humean	supervenience	is		 the	neo-Humean	thesis	that	every	contingent	truth	about	a	world—law,	dependency	hypothesis,	or	what	you	will—holds	somehow	in	virtue	of	that	world’s	total	history	of	manifest	matters	of	particular	fact.	Same	history,	same	everything.	(Lewis	1981:	20)		The	“world’s	total	history	of	manifest	matters	of	particular	fact”	is	usually	called	the	‘Humean	mosaic’.	It	comprises	the	complete	pattern	of	instantiations	of	fundamental	properties	and	the	spatiotemporal	relations	between	them.1	Humean	supervenience	is	Humean	because	the	instantiations	of	fundamental	properties	are	‘loose’	in	the	sense	
                                               1	Lewis	proposes	that	the	fundamental	properties	are	perfectly	natural	and	intrinsic	(Lewis	1983).	This	definition	of	Humean	Supervenience	might	be	in	tension	with	fundamental	physics,	especially	quantum	physics	(see	Maudlin	2007).	See	Lewis	(1986a:	xi,	1994:	474)	for	important	qualifications.	Nothing	in	what	follows	hinges	on	these	qualifications.	
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that	they	are	freely	recombinable:	no	property	instantiation	has	any	modal	implications	for	its	spatiotemporal	neighborhood.2		Humean	reductionism	about	laws	of	nature	is	the	view	that	the	laws	reduce	to	facts	about	the	Humean	mosaic.3	David	Lewis’s	influential	best	systems	account	(BSA),	which	is	based	on	pioneering	work	by	Mill	and	Ramsey,	provides	a	two-step	recipe	for	this	reduction.	First,	look	for	the	best	systematization	of	the	Humean	mosaic.	Such	a	systematization,	according	to	Lewis,	is	an	axiomatized,	deductively	closed	system	that	contains	only	truths.	Furthermore,	the	primitive	vocabulary	in	its	axioms	must	refer	to	perfectly	natural	properties	(Lewis	1983:	367–368).	A	system	is	best,	just	in	case	it	strikes	an	optimal	balance	between	strength	and	simplicity.	Strength	measures	the	information	content	of	the	system	and	simplicity	the	(syntactic)	complexity	of	its	axioms.4	Second,	the	laws	are	identified	with	the	contingent	regularities	that	are	axioms	or	theorems	in	the	best	system	(Lewis	1994:	478).	Lewis	(1983:	367)	initially	suggests	that	if	different	systems	are	tied	for	best,	a	contingent	regularity	must	be	part	of	all	best	systems	in	order	to	be	a	law.	In	later	works	(1994:	479),	he	argues	that	in	such	circumstances	there	would	not	be	any	laws,	though	he	maintains	that	such	ties	are	unlikely.		The	guiding	idea	behind	the	BSA	is	that	the	physical	laws	are	not	identified	in	isolation	as	in	the	case	of	traditional	regularity-theories	(see	Hempel	1965).	Instead	the	laws	are	those	regularities	that	can	be	integrated	into	a	system	that	as	a	whole	describes	as	much	of	the	world	as	possible	in	as	compact	a	way	as	possible	(see	Lewis	1983:	367).	The	BSA	promises	to	distinguish	laws	from	non-laws	without	positing	any	metaphysical	structure	over	and	above	the	Humean	mosaic.	Moreover,	it	arguably	draws	this	distinction	by	appealing	to	the	same	theoretical	virtues	that	physics	itself	uses	when	discovering	laws	(see	Lewis	1983:	367	and	1986a:	123;	cf.	Earman	1986:	88	and	Loewer	2007:	320).	Much	recent	discussion	of	the	BSA	has	focused	on	how	the	
                                               2	Some	amendments	of	free	combination	are	necessary	to	deal	with	fundamental	quantitative	properties	or	(vectorial)	magnitudes	(see	Dorr	and	Hawthorne	2013,	Hall	2012,	Hawthorne	2006,	and	Weatherson	2015).	Free	recombination	enables	a	reductive	account	of	modality	(see	Lewis	1986b;	cf.	Wilson	2015).		3	See	Lewis	(1988:	30–31,	fn.	15).	If	we	talk	about	laws	(of	nature)	in	the	following,	we	mean	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics,	as	opposed	to	the	so-called	laws	of	the	special	sciences.		4	See	Lewis	(1973:	73).	Lewis	(1994)	introduces	the	further	condition	of	‘fit’	to	cover	chancy	laws.	Roughly	put,	a	system	that	assigns	the	actual	history	of	events	a	higher	chance	of	happening	has	a	better	fit	than	one	that	assigns	it	a	lower	chance.	For	our	purposes,	however,	addressing	non-chancy	laws	is	sufficient.	
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notions	of	strength	and	simplicity	ought	to	be	understood	and	whether	the	BSA	really	succeeds	in	correctly	delineating	the	laws	from	the	non-laws	(see,	e.g.,	Earman	1984,	1986,	Loewer	1996,	Roberts	2008,	and	Woodward	2014).		In	this	paper,	we	will	use	a	general	challenge	for	Humean	accounts	of	laws	to	motivate	a	new	version	of	the	BSA.	Even	if	a	Humean	account	of	laws	correctly	delineates	the	laws	from	the	non-laws,	it	still	needs	to	explain	why,	in	light	of	a	Humean	metaphysics,	it	makes	senses	that	physics	distinguishes	between	laws	and	non-laws	in	the	way	it	does.	In	particular,	it	is	puzzling	from	a	Humean	perspective	why	physics	seeks	laws	that	have	modal	latitude,	that	is,	cover	a	wide	range	of	non-actual	circumstances	(see	Hall	2012,	2015).	Our	goal	is	to	develop	a	version	of	the	BSA	that	meets	this	challenge.5		The	paper	has	the	following	structure:	First,	we	argue	that	orthodox	versions	of	the	BSA	leave	unexplained	why	science	aims	for	laws	that	display	modal	latitude	(§2).	Second,	we	defend	a	reformed	version	of	the	BSA	according	to	which	laws	are	calibrated	toward	providing	information	that	is	cognitively	useful	for	limited	creatures	like	us	(§3).	And	third,	we	argue	that	our	version	of	the	BSA	explains	the	modal	latitude	of	laws	that	is	implicit	in	scientific	practice	(§4).	We	conclude	by	comparing	our	account	to	other	recent	versions	of	the	BSA	that	also	emphasize	the	importance	of	our	cognitive	limitations	(§5).	
	
2	The	challenge	from	scientific	practice	Physics	arguably	aims	to	discover	the	fundamental	laws	of	nature	and	distinguishes	them	from	accidental	facts	that	can,	in	principle,	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	laws.	A	philosophical	theory	of	laws	should	explain	why,	in	light	of	its	metaphysics,	the	laws	have	this	relevance	for	science.	Why,	in	Hall’s	(2015:	268)	words,	are	the	laws	“distinctively	appropriate	targets	for	scientific	inquiry?”			 This	latter	requirement	poses	a	special	challenge	for	Humeans.	Non-Humeans	hold	that	the	laws	are	grounded	in	a	distinctive	kind	of	fundamental	modal	structure.6	
                                               5	Cohen	and	Callender	(2009)	and	Hicks	(forthcoming)	defend	Humean	accounts	of	laws	that	are	(partly)	similar	in	spirit	to	the	one	we	will	propose.	We	contrast	our	account	with	their	respective	accounts	in	section	5.	6	For	instance,	Armstrong	(1983)	identifies	laws	with	instantiations	of	an	irreducible	higher-order	necessitation	relation	between	first	order	universals.	Maudlin	(2007)	regards	the	fundamental	(dynamical)	laws	as	sui	generis	entities.	Bird	(2007)	argues	that	the	laws	originate	
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They	can	then	appeal	to	this	extra	structure	to	explain	why	the	laws	are	of	special	interest	to	science.	Humeans,	by	contrast,	hold	that	the	world	fundamentally	just	is	an	arrangement	of	non-modal	properties.	So,	there	is	no	distinctive	metaphysical	structure	that	demarcates	laws	from	non-laws.	Why	then	are	some	facts	about	the	arrangement	of	non-modal	properties	(viz.,	facts	that	have	the	status	of	laws)	of	special	interest	to	science	but	not	others	(viz.,	facts	that	do	not	have	the	status	of	laws)?	Hall	(2012,	2015)	has	forcefully	argued	that	existing	Humean	theories	of	laws	cannot	fully	explain	the	laws’	importance	for	science.	If	all	that	exists	is	the	Humean	mosaic,	it	would	be	natural	for	science	to	aim	for	laws	that	encode	as	much	information	as	possible	about	the	mosaic	in	as	simple	a	form	as	possible.	This	idea	is	echoed	in	Lewis’s	BSA.	Lewis	(1983:	367)	says	the	following	about	the	virtues	of	best	systems: 	 I	take	a	suitable	system	to	be	one	that	has	the	virtues	we	aspire	to	in	our	own	 theory-building,	and	that	has	them	to	the	greatest	extent	possible	given	the	way		the	world	is.	It	must	be	entirely	true;	it	must	be	closed	under	strict	implication;	it		must	be	as	simple	in	axiomatisation	as	it	can	be	without	sacrificing	too	much		information	content;	and	it	must	have	as	much	information	content	as	it	can	have		without	sacrificing	too	much	simplicity.			So	the	members	of	Lewis’s	best	system	jointly	make	up	the	most	efficient	summary	of	the	Humean	mosaic.	From	the	perspective	of	a	Humean	metaphysics,	it	would	then	appear	to	make	perfect	sense	to	treat	all	of	these	facts	as	laws.	But,	in	fact,	science	does	not	regard	some	of	these	facts	as	even	serious	candidates	for	laws.	(Note	that	Lewis’s	BSA	arguably	already	takes	this	fact	into	account	by	reserving	law	status	for	just	the	regularities	in	the	best	system.	We	will	come	back	to	this	point	shortly.)	Hall	(2015:	270)	points	out	that	if	science	aimed	at	discovering	the	most	informative	and	simplest	systematization	of	the	Humean	mosaic,	then	what	he	calls	the	“phony	fundamental	constant”	would	be	a	serious	candidate	for	a	law.	The	phony	constant	is	a	single	real	number	that	encodes	the	entire	physical	state	of	the	universe	at	an	instant:	“just	take	all	the	coordinates,	masses,	and	charges	of	all	the	particles,	expressed	in	decimal	notation,	and	interleave	the	digits”	(ibid.).	A	system	that	combines	the	phony	constant	with	two-way	deterministic	dynamical	laws	encodes	every	truth	
                                                                                                                                                  in	primitive	facts	about	the	dispositional	natures	of	fundamental	properties.	And	Lange	(2009)	traces	back	lawhood	to	primitive	subjunctive	facts.		
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about	the	universe	in	a	very	simple	form.	The	phony	constant	specifies	the	complete	state	of	the	universe	at	one	time,	the	laws	then	determine	its	state	at	all	other	times.		The	phony	constant,	however,	is	clearly	not	a	law	of	nature.	Physicists	might	be	very	interested	in	knowing	the	total	state	of	the	universe	at	a	time	that	the	constant	encodes.	But	they	would	still	treat	it	as	a	mere	accidental	fact	that	can,	in	principle,	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	(dynamical)	laws	and	initial	conditions	(see	Maudlin:	174-175).	Moreover,	the	laws	of	nature	determine	nomological	possibility	such	that	circumstances	are	only	nomologically	possible	if	they	are	compatible	with	the	laws.	So,	if	the	phony	constant	is	added	as	a	law	to	two-way	deterministic	dynamical	equations,	then,	as	Hall	(2015:	269)	points	out,	it	“will	shrink	the	set	of	nomological	possibilities	down	to	one.	But	that	is	a	disaster,	for	[...]	it	is	a	non-negotiable	desideratum	on	an	account	of	laws	that	it	yield	a	non-trivial	distinction	between	what	is	nomologically	possible	and	what	is	not.”	Hence,	the	phony	constant	shows	that	facts	that	one	might	expect	to	be	laws	given	a	Humean	metaphysics	are	not	regarded	as	candidates	for	laws	by	physicists.		Let	us	add	two	clarifications	about	the	phony	constant.	First,	it	might	be	objected	that	because	of	its	huge	number	of	digits	the	phony	constant	is	not	syntactically	simple	and	so	will	not	be	part	of	the	simplest,	most	informative	systematization	of	the	Humean	mosaic.	However,	as	Hall	(2015:	270)	points	out,	our	actual	laws	contain	constants	that	are	syntactically	just	as	complex	as	the	phony	constant.	So,	any	standard	of	simplicity	that	would	rule	out	the	phony	constant	would	also	rule	out	these	legitimate	constants.	Second,	the	phony	constant	also	is	not	ruled	out	by	Lewis’s	(1983:	367–368)	requirement	that	the	primitive	vocabulary	in	the	best	system	only	refers	to	natural	properties.	Since	the	phony	constant	concerns	only	particle	positions,	charges,	and	masses,	which	are	prime	candidates	for	being	perfectly	natural	properties,	it	is	compatible	with	this	naturalness-constraint	(cf.	Hicks	forthcoming).	At	this	point,	Humeans	may	concede	that	facts	like	the	phony	constant	can	be	part	of	the	best	system	yet	deny	that	these	facts	thereby	count	as	laws.	In	fact,	you	might	think	that	this	was	the	idea	all	along.	Here	is	Lewis:		 The	ideal	system	need	not	consist	entirely	of	regularities;	particular	facts	may		gain	entry	if	they	contribute	enough	to	collective	simplicity	and	strength.	(For		instance,	certain	particular	facts	about	the	Big	Bang	might	be	strong	candidates.)		
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But	only	the	regularities	of	the	system	are	to	count	as	laws.	(Lewis	1983:	367)		By	restricting	the	laws	to	regularities,	Lewis	allows	that	particular	facts,	such	as	the	phony	constant,	may	enter	the	best	system	yet	still	insists	that	they	are	not	laws.			But	that	particular	facts	such	as	the	phony	constant	may	be	part	of	the	best	system	still	is	troubling	for	Humean	reductionism.	First,	it	is	not	clear	that	Lewis’s	restriction	that	only	regularities	can	be	laws	is	scientifically	motivated.	As	Maudlin	(2007:	11-12)	points	out,	it	is	highly	unnatural	to	think	of,	for	example,	Newton’s	second	law	or	the	Schrödinger	equation	as	regularities.	Moreover,	some	alleged	candidates	for	physical	laws	are	clearly	not	regularities.	For	example,	Feynman	(1965:	116)	proposed	that	it	is	a	law	that	the	universe	started	in	an	initial	state	of	low-entropy	(see	also	Albert	2000,	2015).	So,	an	adequate	account	of	laws	should	not	rule	out	that	some	non-regularities	are	laws	a	priori	(see	our	discussion	in	section	4	below).	Second,	an	adequate	theory	of	laws	not	only	needs	to	get	their	extension	right	but	also	needs	to	explain	their	importance	for	scientific	practice	(see	our	discussion	of	Loewer’s	(2007)	account	below).	So,	even	if	it	were	true	that	all	laws	are	regularities,	it	is	still	not	clear	how	this	‘formal’	feature	would	explain	their	importance	to	scientific	practice.	After	all,	non-regularities	in	the	best	systems	would	be	just	as	much	part	of	the	world’s	best	systematization	as	regularities.	So,	why	does	the	mere	fact	that	they	are	not	regularities	disqualify	them	from	having	the	same	relevance	for	science	as	laws?	At	the	very	least,	Lewis	would	need	to	explain	what	is	so	special	about	regularities.		And,	third,	an	analogous	challenge	as	the	one	posed	by	the	phony	constant	arises	with	respect	to	regularities.	Suppose	it	is	true	that	the	“total	quantity	of	electric	charge	at	each	moment	is	Q”	(Lange	2009:	57).	This	regularity	is	a	natural	candidate	for	being	part	of	the	best	system.	As	seen	above,	Lewis	admits	particular	facts	(for	instance	about	the	Big	Bang)	in	best	systems.	Indeed,	he	(1986a:	123)	explicitly	allows	that	the	laws	themselves	may	refer	to	particular	facts.	So,	the	best	system	may	contain	the	fact	that	the	total	charge	of	the	universe	at	some	particular	time	is	Q.	And	suppose	also,	as	is	plausible,	that	it	is	a	true	regularity	in	the	best	system	that	charge	is	conserved.	These	two	facts	together	then	entail	the	above	regularity.	Moreover,	since	best	systems	are	deductively	closed	(Lewis	1994:	478),	this	regularity	will	itself	be	part	of	the	best	system.	Alternatively,	this	and	similar	regularities	may	enter	the	best	system	‘directly’.	They	would	add	an	enormous	amount	of	information	while	making	the	system	only	
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slightly	less	simple	(Lange	2009:	57	and	Woodward	2014:	97).	So,	these	regularities	would	be	perfect	Humean	candidates	for	laws.	Yet,	actual	physics	does	not	treat	regularities	about	the	total	charge	of	the	universe	(or	other	specific	quantities)	as	serious	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.	So,	restricting	the	laws	to	regularities	still	leaves	unmotivated	why	science	draws	the	distinction	between	laws	and	non-laws	in	the	way	it	does.	Moreover,	there	is	a	second	aspect	to	Hall’s	challenge	that	is	equally	troubling	for	Humean	reductionism.	The	facts	that	science	does	regard	as	serious	candidates	for	laws	do	not	appear	to	be	natural	candidates	for	laws	in	light	of	a	Humean	metaphysics.	Following	Hall,	it	will	be	helpful	to	divide	the	information	content	of	the	fundamental	physical	laws	into	two	factors:			[T]he	fundamental	laws	“factor”	the	set	of	nomologically	possible	total	histories	of	particle	behavior	into	an	initial	conditions	hypothesis	(ICH)	and	a	dynamical	hypothesis	(DH).	(Hall	2015:	263)		The	ICH	delimits	“a	set	of	nomologically	possible	initial	conditions”	(ibid.).	The	DH	specifies	“how	each	such	initial	condition	would	evolve	forward	in	time”	(ibid.).	In	other	words,	the	information	content	of	a	set	of	laws	gets	factored	into:	(i)	what	initial	conditions	they	allow;	and	(ii)	how	they	restrict	the	evolution	of	the	universe	as	a	whole	given	each	such	condition.		Hall	points	out	that	theories	that	fundamental	physics	takes	seriously	as	candidates	for	the	fundamental	laws	have	a	strong	DH	but	a	weak	ICH.	It	is	easy	to	motivate	that	physics	aims	for	a	strong	DH.	The	gold	standard	for	a	strong	DH	is	determinism,	which	allows	given	the	world’s	initial	state	only	one	way	for	it	to	evolve	(cf.	Earman	1984,	1986).	Many	candidates	for	fundamental	laws	from	the	history	of	physics	including	Newton’s	laws,	the	laws	of	(classical)	electrodynamics,	and	the	laws	of	relativity	are	deterministic.	And	even	when	determinism	is	in	doubt,	such	as	in	quantum	mechanics,	scientists	express	a	clear	preference	for	determinism.	For	instance,	Einstein	has	famously	insisted	that	“God	does	not	play	dice.”		It	is	equally	plausible	that	science	aims	for	laws	that	have	a	weak	ICH.	Hall	points	out	that	Newton’s	laws	are	preferable	over	Kepler’s	laws	of	planetary	motion	because	the	former	answer	“questions	not	merely	about	how	the	elements	of	the	solar	system	did,	do,	and	will	behave,	but	also	about	how	they	would	have	behaved	under	alternative	
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physical	conditions”	(Hall	2015:	263).	In	general,	most	candidates	for	physical	laws	provide	lots	of	information	about	what	would	have	happened	if	the	initial	conditions	were	different.	For	example,	Coulomb’s	law	determines	the	electrostatic	forces	between	charges	q1	and	q2	at	a	distance	r	for	any	values	of	q1,	q2,	and	r.	Taken	at	face	value,	Coulomb’s	law	ranges	over	all	values	of	these	variables,	not	just	values	that	are	actually	instantiated.	So,	it	applies	to	a	wide	range	of	merely	possible	initial	conditions.		It	is	not	part	of	the	proposal	that	laws	apply	to	every	metaphysically	possible	initial	condition.	For	example,	every	set	of	laws	arguably	rules	out	initial	conditions	that	include	‘alien	properties’,	i.e.,	properties	that	are	not	instantiated	in	the	actual	world	(see	Hall	2012:	47–49).	Moreover,	several	non-dynamical	laws	rule	out	metaphysically	possible	initial	conditions.	For	instance,	the	Wiedemann-Franz-law	entails	that	every	thermally	conductive	piece	of	metal	is	also	electrically	conductive.	So,	this	law	excludes	metaphysically	possible	initial	conditions	where,	for	instance,	a	piece	of	metal	is	thermally	conductive	but	not	electrically	conductive	(or	vice	versa).	Other	possible	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws	place	even	stronger	restrictions	on	the	initial	conditions.	As	mentioned	above,	it	may	be	a	fundamental	physical	law	that	the	universe	started	in	an	initial	state	of	low-entropy	(see	Albert	2000).	Adding	this	restriction	to	a	set	of	laws	would	rule	out	all	initial	conditions	where	the	universe	does	not	start	in	an	initial	state	of	low-entropy.	But	even	such	laws	still	would	have	a	comparatively	weak	ICH	in	that	they	allow	a	significant	range	of	possible	initial	conditions.	For	example,	a	law	that	dictates	that	the	universe	starts	in	a	low-entropy	state	still	allows	different	ways	for	this	condition	to	be	microscopically	realized.	These	differences	in	microstates,	combined	with	plausible	dynamical	laws,	then	allow	for	things	being	very	different	from	how	they	actually	are,	including	circumstances	where	no	galaxies	form	or	no	life	exists	in	the	universe.		Hall	argues	that	Humean	reductionism	has	no	ready	explanation	for	why	science	aims	for	laws	that	have	a	weak	ICH.	A	set	of	laws	that	has	a	weak	ICH	applies	to	a	wide	range	of	other	possible	initial	conditions.	We	will	call	this	feature	modal	latitude:			
Modal	latitude.	A	set	of	laws	has	modal	latitude,	just	in	case	it	permits	a	wide	range	of	possible	initial	conditions.		
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Modal	latitude	allows	a	set	of	laws	to	answer	“questions	both	about	what	would	have	happened,	and	about	what	would	have	to	have	happened,	had	conditions	in	the	world	been	different	in	some	specified	respect.”	(Hall	2015:	271;	italics	in	the	original).	This	aspect	of	the	laws	seems	to	make	sense	for	non-Humeans,	which	hold	that	the	world	has	fundamental	modal	structure.	The	modal	latitude	of	the	laws	of	nature	then	arises	because	they	map	out	this	modal	structure.7	But	what	is	the	purpose	of	modal	latitude	for	Humeans?	If	Humeanism	is	true,	then	the	world	has	no	modal	structure	that	is	metaphysically	prior	to	the	laws	of	nature.	So,	there	is	no	antecedent	modal	structure	for	the	laws	to	describe.	Why	then	is	science	interested	in	laws	that	apply	to	a	whole	range	of	merely	possible	initial	conditions?	Allowing	non-actual	initial	conditions,	after	all,	comes	at	the	cost	of	providing	less	information	about	what	actually	happens.			 We	now	have	the	pieces	in	place	to	formulate	Hall’s	challenge	for	Humean	accounts	of	laws.	Facts	that	one	would	expect	to	be	prime	candidates	for	laws	given	a	Humean	metaphysics	(because	they	encode	a	lot	of	information	about	what	actually	happens,	such	as	the	phony	constant)	are	not	considered	as	such	by	fundamental	physics.	At	the	same	time,	the	facts	that	fundamental	physics	does	take	seriously	as	laws	seem	to	be	poor	candidates	for	laws	from	a	Humean	perspective	(because	they	talk	about	other	possible	initial	conditions	at	the	cost	of	providing	information	about	the	actual	mosaic).	So,	the	standards	of	lawhood	that	physics	in	fact	employs	appear	to	be	out	of	touch	with	a	Humean	metaphysics.	Humeans	need	to	meet	this	challenge	by	clarifying	how	they	can	motivate	the	standards	for	lawhood	that	physics	in	fact	employs.	Else,	there	is	the	risk	that	their	account	has	revisionary	consequences	for	scientific	practice	that	arguably	do	not	arise	for	non-Humean	accounts.	Meeting	this	challenge	requires	more	than	spelling	out	an	account	that	correctly	predicts	what	the	actual	laws	are	(see	Hall	2015:	272).	As	Lange’s	(2009)	and	Woodward’s	(2014)	criticisms	indicate,	Lewis’s	BSA	may	fail	to	correctly	delineate	the	laws	from	the	non-laws.	Proponents	of	the	BSA,	however,	may	simply	tweak	Lewis’s	criteria	for	lawhood	to	ensure	it	gets	the	distinction	right.	Hall	(2015:	266)	calls	the	“unofficial	guiding	idea”	of	Lewis's	BSA	the	claim	“that	our	implicit	scientific	standards	
                                               7	For	example,	Lange’s	(2009)	non-Humean	account	according	to	which,	roughly	put,	what	makes	something	a	law	is	that	it	is	invariant	under	a	wide	range	of	counterfactual	perturbations	seems	to	be	tailor-made	to	capture	the	modal	latitude	of	laws.	We	are	skeptical,	however,	that	non-Humeans	accounts,	in	general,	offer	satisfying	explanations	of	the	modal	features	of	laws	(cf.	Jaag	2014).	
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for	judging	lawhood	are	in	fact	constitutive	of	lawhood.”	The	official	idea	is	that	these	standards	are	strength	and	simplicity.	But	you	might	interpret	these	virtues	as	mere	stand-ins	for	whatever	standards	sciences	in	fact	uses	when	discovering	laws.	A	system	then	is	best,	just	in	case	its	members	jointly	best	satisfy	these	criteria	(cf.	Loewer’s	2007:	324).	This	version	of	the	BSA	then	gets	the	distinction	between	laws	and	non-laws	right	by	fiat.8	For	example,	since	obviously,	the	standards	actual	physics	uses	rule	out	the	phony	constant	as	a	law,	if	we	use	the	very	same	standards	as	criteria	for	the	bestness	of	a	system,	the	phony	constant	will	also	not	be	part	of	the	best	system.	But	such	an	account	does	nothing	to	explain	why	the	criteria	that	science	in	fact	uses	to	identify	laws	are	motivated	by	Humean	lights.	The	above	discussion	shows	that	the	standards	of	lawhood	implicit	in	scientific	practice	favor	laws	that	have	modal	latitude.	Why,	given	a	Humean	metaphysics,	does	it	make	sense	for	science	to	aim	at	discovering	laws	with	this	feature?	To	answer	this	question,	Humeans	have	to	motivate	the	standards	for	lawhood	implicit	in	scientific	practice.	In	the	rest	of	the	paper,	we	develop	and	defend	a	way	of	motivating	these	standards:	making	best	systems	best	for	us.	We	will	argue	that	the	laws’	modal	latitude	is	a	by-product	of	their	cognitive	usefulness	for	creatures	like	us.	We	will	first	show	that	it	is	an	independently	plausible	Humean	constraint	on	laws	that	they	need	to	be	useful	to	limited	beings	like	us	(§3).	We	then	show	that	the	modal	latitude	of	the	laws	of	nature	falls	right	out	of	this	constraint	(§4).			
3	Best	systems	that	are	best	for	us	 		 	In	this	section,	we	will	argue	that	best	systems	need	to	provide	information	that	is	useful	for	limited	beings	like	us.	Not	all	truths	about	the	Humean	mosaic	are	equally	useful	for	limited	beings.	Imagine	a	world	almanac	that	lists	every	particular	truth,	one	after	another.	This	information,	though	abundant,	would	be	very	hard	to	store	and	it	would	be	difficult	to	extract	relevant	bits	from	it.	Truths	that	are	useful	for	limited	
                                               8	There	is	one	outstanding	worry	for	this	proposal.	The	epistemic	standards	that	science	uses	to	discover	laws	may	be	tied.	That	is,	two	or	more	systems	may	satisfy	these	criteria	equally	well.	If	Humeans	then	take	these	epistemic	standards	as	constitutive	of	laws,	it	would,	in	this	hypothetical	case,	be	metaphysically	indeterminate	what	the	laws	of	nature	are.	But	this	consequence	is	implausible.	This	worry	seems	to	be	at	the	heart	of	the	two	hypothetical	scenarios	that	Hall	(2015:	ch.	17.7)	discusses	as	further	challenges	for	Humean	reductionism	in	the	conclusion	of	his	article.	Discussing	this	challenge	is	a	topic	for	another	paper.	
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beings	need	to	be	organized	more	efficiently	even	if	that	comes	at	the	cost	of	losing	information.		 Philosophers	frequently	use	the	idea	that	information	about	the	Humean	mosaic	needs	to	be	organized	around	the	cognitive	needs	of	limited	beings	like	us	to	motivate	the	BSA.	David	Albert	imagines	an	audience	with	God	where	you	get	to	ask	about	the	world.	Albert	points	out	that	God	listing	every	single	truth	about	the	world	would	be	of	very	little	use	to	limited	creatures	like	us:		 		[Y]ou	explain	to	God	that	you’re	actually	a	bit	pressed	for	time,	that	this	is	not	all	you	have	to	do	today,	that	you	are	not	going	to	be	in	a	position	to	hear	out	the	whole	story.	And	you	ask	if	maybe	there’s	something	meaty	and	pithy	and	helpful	and	informative	and	short	that	He	might	be	able	to	tell	you	about	the	world	which	(you	understand)	would	not	amount	to	everything,	or	nearly	everything,	but	would	nonetheless	still	somehow	amount	to	a	lot.	Something	that	will	serve	you	well,	or	reasonably	well,	or	as	well	as	possible,	in	making	your	way	about	in	the	world.	(Albert	2015:	23)		Albert	emphasizes	that	beings	like	us	have	limited	resources:	you	are	“a	bit	pressed	for	time”	and	not	in	“a	position	to	hear	out	the	whole	story.”	You	are	better	off	with	something	that	is	cognitively	more	tractable,	even	if	that	means	losing	some	information	content,	as	long	as	the	result	is	still	informative	enough	for	“making	your	way	about	in	the	world.”	Beebee	(2000:	547)	similarly	points	out	that	the	information	in	best	systems	needs	to	be	“comprehensible	to	our	feeble,	finite	minds.”	Despite	its	prominence	in	informally	glossing	the	BSA,	the	idea	of	fitting	the	laws	to	the	cognitive	needs	of	limited	beings	has	played	very	little	role	in	systematically	developing	the	view.9		 For	Humeans,	the	laws	do	not	latch	on	to	any	pre-existing	modal	structure	that	delineates	facts	that	hold	as	a	matter	of	law	from	merely	accidental	facts.	It	is	then	extremely	natural	to	think	that	what	distinguishes	the	laws	has,	at	least	in	part,	to	do	with	us.	As	Hall	(2015:	268)	puts	it,	“[h]ow	could	the	details	of	our	peculiar	human	situation	not	be	relevant	to	this	matter?”	In	what	follows,	we	will	take	up	this	suggestion	and	defend	a	version	of	the	BSA	that	explains	the	laws’	distinctive	status	for	science	in	terms	of	their	usefulness	for	limited	creatures	likes	us.	We	will	argue	that	this	version	of	the	BSA	meets	the	challenge	for	Humean	accounts	we	have	outlined	in	the	previous	
                                               9	Hicks’s	(forthcoming)	“Epistemic	Role	Account”	and	Cohen	and	Callender’s	(2009,	2010)	better	best	system	account	are	an	exception.	We	compare	them	to	our	account	in	section	4.	Dorst	(forthcoming)	develops	a	similar	view	to	the	one	discussed	in	this	paper.		
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section.	Moreover,	it	explains	why	our	actual	candidates	for	the	physical	laws	have	several	striking	features	that	make	them	useful	for	creatures	like	us.		Our	version	of	the	BSA	makes	it	an	explicit	requirement	on	laws	of	nature	that	they	are	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	In	particular,	we	defend	the	following	constraint	on	laws:		 (CU)	 Laws	of	nature	encode	information	in	a	way	that	maximizes	their	cognitive	usefulness	for	creatures	like	us.10			By	‘creatures	like	us’,	we	mean	creatures	with	limited	cognitive	resources	(cf.	Caton	2014	and	Morton	2012).	We	do	not	mean	specifically	humans	or	humans	given	our	current	state	of	technology.	We	mean	creatures	that	have	limitations	with	regard	to	their	cognitive	resources	that	are	general	enough	to	be	shared	by	all	embodied	agents,	including	current	humans,	future	humans,	and	alien	scientists	(if	there	are	any).			 These	limitations	include	the	following:	First,	finite	beings	only	have	incomplete	information.	They	never	know	the	state	of	the	world	with	full	precision.	Instead,	their	knowledge	will	be	partial	and	possibly	slightly	inaccurate	due	to	the	limitations	of	their	perceptual	faculties	and	measurement	equipment.	Second,	they	are	limited	with	regard	to	how	much	information	they	can	store	and	process.	In	particular,	limited	creatures	cannot	compute	arbitrarily	complex	functions.	And,	third,	limited	beings	have	finite	resources.	So,	they	have	an	interest	in	completing	cognitive	tasks	as	efficiently	as	possible,	that	is,	by	minimizing	how	much	information	they	need	to	gather,	store,	or	process.	Our	proposal	is	that	scientific	inquiry	is	structured	around	the	needs	of	creatures	with	these	kinds	of	limitations.			 The	other	notion	that	needs	clarification	is	‘cognitive	usefulness’.	We	assume	that	the	main	cognitive	function	of	the	laws	is	facilitating	predictions.	Laws	of	nature	allow	us	to	derive	new	truths	from	known	truths.	The	laws	plausibly	have	further	cognitive	functions,	such	as	action-guidance	and	explanation.	But	we	will	focus	on	prediction	because	it	arguably	is	the	function	of	the	laws	that	is	most	central	to	the	practice	of	physics.	So,	CU	says	that	laws	of	nature	help	limited	beings	get	around	in	the	
                                               10	You	may	worry	that	CU	is	objectionably	anthropocentric,	but	we	will	argue	below	that	the	ensuing	anthropocentricity	is	unproblematic.	
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world	by	encoding	truths	that	help	them	make	predictions	from	information	available	to	them.		We	propose	a	modified	BSA	that	incorporates	CU.	Best	systems	need	to	be	best	
for	us,	that	is,	contain	information	that	is	useful	for	solving	the	kinds	of	‘prediction-problems’	that	limited	beings	face.	These	problems	involve	predicting	the	evolution	of	physical	systems	from	incomplete	and	possibly	slightly	inaccurate	information.	A	system	that	is	best	for	us	should	facilitate	solving	as	many	of	these	problems	as	possible	with	as	little	cognitive	effort	as	possible.	Such	a	system	has	to	allow	us	to	make	the	relevant	predictions	from	the	available	input	without	being	too	demanding	on	our	capabilities	for	storing	and	processing	information.	We	propose	that	the	laws	are	whatever	facts	are	part	of	such	a	best	system.11		Some	examples	will	help	illustrate	what	such	systems	look	like.	Suppose	you	want	to	predict	the	future	behavior	of	a	rock	on	your	desk.	First,	consider	a	system	that	requires	a	complete	description	of	the	world’s	current	microstate	as	input.	Such	a	system	would	not	be	cognitively	useful	for	limited	beings	because	they	do	not	possess	such	complete	information.	Second,	consider	a	system	that	just	lists	every	particular	truth	about	the	world.	This	system	would	not	require	any	input	about	the	current	state	of	the	world	for	making	predictions	about	the	behavior	of	the	rock	since	all	information	is	already	part	of	the	system	itself.	However,	it	would	be	massively	resource-intensive	to	store	all	of	this	information	and	to	locate	the	relevant	bits	about	the	behavior	of	the	rock.	So,	this	system	also	is	not	cognitively	useful.	Finally,	consider	a	system	that	is	relatively	easy	to	store	(perhaps	a	small	number	of	differential	equations)	and	that	allows	you	to	predict	the	future	behavior	of	the	rock	when	combined	with	(approximate)	information	about	its	current	state.	Such	a	system	would	be	enormously	cognitively	useful	since	it	is	relatively	easy	to	store	and	the	required	input	readily	available	and	easy	to	process.	Systems	that	are	best	for	us	need	to	balance	competing	virtues.	First,	they	need	to	minimize	the	complexity	of	the	laws.	Systems	that	are	highly	complex	(a	long	list	of	particular	facts)	are	more	difficult	to	process	than	less	complex	facts	(a	small	number	of	differential	equations).	Second,	cognitively	useful	systems	need	to	minimize	the	‘input	
                                               11	Ismael	(2015:	197)	proposes	that	laws	are	“partially	prepared	solutions	to	frequently	encountered	problems.”	Our	account	can	be	seen	as	a	development	of	this	idea.	(Ismael	herself	does	not	wholeheartedly	endorse	Humeanism	about	laws.)		
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information’	that	is	needed	to	make	predictions	(cf.	Sober	1975	and	Thagard’s	1978:	88).	For	example,	systems	that	allow	us	to	predict	the	future	evolution	of	a	rock	from	its	rough	macroscopic	state	are	easier	to	apply	by	limited	beings	than	systems	that	require	as	input	its	exact	microstate.	These	two	virtues	can	trade	off	against	each	other.	Sometimes	by	building	more	information	into	the	laws,	less	information	about	the	background	conditions	is	needed	to	use	them	for	making	predictions.	For	example,	a	system	of	laws	that	already	has	all	information	about	the	rock	built	into	it	requires	no	added	information	about	background	conditions	to	make	predictions.	But	building	this	information	into	it	comes	at	the	cost	of	making	the	system	very	complex	and	difficult	to	process.	A	system	will	be	more	useful	the	less	information	you	need	as	input	and	the	less	storing	and	processing	is	required	to	arrive	at	the	relevant	predictions.	Systems	that	are	best	for	us	will	be	relatively	simple,	yet	be	combinable	with	incomplete	and	possibly	slightly	incorrect	information	about	the	background	conditions	to	result	in	many	predictions.			Best	systems	that	are	best	for	us	are	different	from	Lewis’s	best	systems	in	at	least	two	respects.	First,	Lewis's	best	systems	aim	to	provide	as	much	information	as	possible	about	the	entire	Humean	mosaic	in	as	simple	a	form	as	possible.	Our	best	systems,	by	contrast,	do	not	aim	to	provide	this	information	all	by	themselves.	Instead,	they	aim	to	provide	the	kind	of	information	that	limited	beings	can	efficiently	use	to	infer	from	truths	about	certain	bits	of	the	mosaic	to	truths	about	other	bits	of	the	mosaic.	Second,	Lewis’s	best	systems	adhere	to	objective	global	virtues	of	strength	and	simplicity.	By	contrast,	the	virtues	of	our	best	systems	are	tailored	to	the	capacities	of	cognitively	limited	beings.		We	will	defend	our	account	by	arguing	that	CU	is	an	independently	plausible	constraint	on	laws	of	nature.	If	cognitive	usefulness	is	a	virtue	of	laws	of	nature,	we	expect	the	information	encoded	in	the	laws	to	be	streamlined	toward	making	predictions	from	incomplete	information.	We	will	provide	two	arguments	that	show	that	the	laws	science	aims	for	have	exactly	this	form.		Our	first	argument	for	CU	is	that	our	best	past	and	present	candidates	for	the	fundamental	physical	laws	have	features	that	make	them	cognitively	extremely	useful.	This	point	is	not	obvious.	Our	best	candidates	for	the	fundamental	laws	since	at	least	Newton	are	such	that	what	happens	in	one	place	may	depend	on	what	happens	in	numerous	other	places.	Newtonian	gravitation	and	classical	electromagnetism,	for	
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example,	entail	that	every	massive	or	charged	body	influences	every	other	massive	or	charged	body.	Things	get	slightly	better	with	Special	Relativity,	but	the	behavior	of	a	system	may	still	depend	on	what	happens	in	a	cross-section	of	its	entire	backward	light	cone.	Moreover,	these	laws	are	such	that	the	exact	microstate	of	a	system	can	in	principle	make	a	difference	to	its	macroscopic	evolution.	So,	it	seems	that	using	the	actual	laws	to	predict	the	evolution	of	any	system	would	require	more	information	than	creatures	like	us	will	ever	have	or	be	able	to	compute.	However,	our	best	candidates	for	the	laws	of	nature	have	a	variety	of	features	that	allow	us	to	derive	approximate	truths	about	systems	from	incomplete	information.	First,	these	laws	have	a	high	degree	of	‘error	tolerance’	(cf.	Callender	2017:	ch.	7).	For	many	problems,	the	solutions	depend	on	the	data	continuously	such	that	small	errors	in	the	data	only	lead	to	small	errors	in	the	solution.	For	example,	suppose	you	want	to	predict	the	trajectory	of	a	(point)	mass	that	is	subject	to	a	constant	net-force.	Solving	the	differential	equations	you	get	from	Newton’s	second	law	tells	you	that	the	future	positions	of	your	mass	is	among	other	things	a	continuous	function	of	its	initial	position.	Thus,	a	small	difference	in	its	initial	position	only	makes	a	small	difference	to	its	future	position.12	This	error-tolerance	allows	that	the	laws	can	be	used	to	derive	approximate	truths	despite	inaccuracies	in	the	available	data.	Second,	as	Elga	(2007)	shows,	our	laws	are	such	that,	given	a	small	number	of	background	assumptions,	they	do	allow	predictions	about	systems	from	relatively	local	bits	of	information	(see	also	Ismael	2009:	91–92	and	Loew	2017).	Suppose	you	want	to	predict	the	future	evolution	of	a	rock	on	your	desk.	Elga	points	out	that	almost	all	of	“the	forces	acting	on	your	rock	from	afar	are	either	negligibly	tiny	or	nearly	constant”	(Elga	2007:	109).	Physics	describes	four	types	of	forces.	Of	these	forces,	strong	and	weak	nuclear	forces	are	negligible	over	distances	that	are	large	compared	to	the	atomic	scale.	Electromagnetic	forces	can	be	strong	across	larger	distances,	but	there	are	not	very	many	strongly	charged	macroscopic	bodies	around.	So,	it	usually	is	negligible	too.	Finally,	gravitation	can	be	strong	across	large	distances.	However,	the	net	gravitational	force	on	objects	usually	does	not	vary	significantly	across	time	and	space.	For	example,	the	net	gravitational	force	on	a	rock	on	your	desk	yesterday	is	roughly	the	same	as	the	net	gravitational	force	on	a	rock	on	my	desk	today.	So,	whenever	we	predict	the	
                                               12	For	chaotic	systems,	however,	small	inaccuracies	in	the	data	do	lead	to	big	inaccuracies	in	the	solutions	even	if	dependence	is	continuous.		
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evolution	of	a	rock,	we	can	typically	treat	the	forces	acting	on	it	from	afar	as	constant	apart	from	small	variations.		We	then	only	need	to	guarantee	that	these	small	variations	in	background	factors	(at	least	in	the	majority	of	cases)	do	not	make	a	difference	to	the	rock’s	macroscopic	behavior.	Fortunately,	this	result	follows	from	features	of	the	dynamical	laws	and	plausible	background	assumptions.	Our	best	candidates	for	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	are	such	that	for	many	macroscopic	system	the	vast	majority	of	compatible	microstates	are	associated	with	the	same	macroscopic	behavior	(this	feature	is	closely	related	to	the	above	described	error-tolerance).	We	then	only	need	to	assume	that	a	given	macroscopic	system	is	in	such	a	‘typical’	microstate.	This	typicality	then	guarantees	that	small	differences	in	external	forces	are	unlikely	to	make	a	difference	to	its	macroscopic	behavior.	Small	difference	in	outside	forces	only	make	a	difference	to	the	system's	microstate.	But	since	the	vast	majority	of	microstates	compatible	with	a	given	macrostate	are	associated	with	the	same	macroscopic	behavior,	such	forces	do	not	result	in	a	different	macroscopic	behavior	(cf.	Elga	2007:	110).	So	we	can	ignore	any	forces	acting	on	the	rock	from	afar	that	are	so	small	that	they	only	affect	its	exact	microstate,	such	as	air	molecules	bumping	into	it	or	small	local	variations	in	gravitational	forces.		It	is	a	highly	non-trivial	feature	of	our	best	candidates	for	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	that	the	vast	majority	of	microstates	compatible	with	a	given	macrostate	lead	to	the	same	macroscopic	behavior.	And	it	is	empirically	well-confirmed	that	we	usually	get	the	correct	predictions	about	the	future	behavior	of	systems	by	assuming	that	their	behavior	is	‘typical’.13	These	two	facts	together	allow	us	to	describe	the	behavior	of	systems	in	terms	of	autonomous,	higher-order	dynamics,	as	they	feature,	for	example,	in	thermodynamics.	As	a	consequence,	coarse-grained	information	about	the	rock	plus	the	knowledge	of	a	small	number	of	background	conditions	is	enough	to	predict	its	rough	macroscopic	evolution.	These	features	of	our	actual	best	candidates	for	the	laws	of	nature	then	are	evidence	that	science	aims	for	laws	that	are	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.		
                                               13	There	is	considerable	debate	in	the	foundations	of	statistical	mechanics	about	what	the	assumption	that	a	system’s	behavior	is	‘typical’	involves.	See	Frigg	(2009)	for	discussion.	See	Albert	(2000,	2015)	for	a	similar	account.	
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Our	second	argument	for	CU	is	based	on	how	scientists	use	the	laws	of	nature	in	practice.	Philosophers	tend	to	think	of	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	as	operating	on	fully-specified	global	time-slices.	But,	as	Frisch	points	out,	physicists	often	use	the	laws	to	make	inferences	from	‘partial	models’,	that	is	models	that	only	provide	an	incomplete,	coarse-grained	specification	of	the	relevant	circumstances:				 Very	often,	even	within	the	context	of	established	or	putatively	“fundamental”	theories,	we	represent	phenomena	not	in	terms	of	a	complete	initial-	and	boundary-value	problem,	which	would	provide	us	with	information	about	the	precise	physical	state	of	each	spacetime	point	in	the	spacetime	region	of	interest,	but	by	specifying	only	a	finite	number	of	relevant	components	of	a	system	at	different	levels	of	grain	and	then	showing	how	these	components	interact.	(Frisch	2014:	62)			Frisch’s	example	is	the	Large	Hadron	Collider.	When	physicists	model	proton	beams	inside	the	collider,	they	leave	out	many	outside	influences	on	the	accelerator	and	model	other	components	only	at	a	very	coarse-grained	level	(see	Frisch	2014:	63).		 	Partial	models	are	crucial	for	physical	practice	because	they	allow	physicists	to	apply	the	laws	of	nature	to	real	life	physical	systems.	The	laws,	at	least	in	principle,	allow	derivations	from	fully	specified	microstates.	But	such	derivations	would	not	allow	us	to	make	any	real-world	predictions	because	we	cannot	know	whether	the	precise	microstates	from	which	such	predictions	are	derived	actually	obtain.	As	Frisch	points	out,	“the	models	physicists	in	fact	use	to	represent	actual	phenomena	very	rarely	if	ever	are	the	complete	structures	that	philosophers	postulate,	because	these	structures	are	in	general	much	too	complex	for	us	ever	actually	to	possess”	(Frisch	2014:	66).	In	applying	the	laws	to	partial	models,	we	make	predictions	about	situations	that	are	specified	rather	coarsely.	We	can	then	be	reasonably	sure	that	these	situations	obtain	at	least	in	carefully	prepared	experimental	set-ups,	and	so	test	the	relevant	predictions.		Not	all	conceivable	laws	of	nature	would	allow	the	successful	use	of	partial	models.	We	can	imagine	laws	whose	predictions	are	so	sensitive	that	one	needs	to	know	the	complete	microstate	of	the	universe	at	some	time	to	derive	any	reliable	predictions.	For	example,	suppose	a	set	of	putative	laws	is	such	that	a	difference	in	the	position	of	any	distant	particle	would	result	in	radically	different	predictions	about	the	macroscopic	evolution	of	systems.	Such	laws	could	not	be	used	to	derive	predictions	about	systems	by	applying	them	to	partial	models.	
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It	is	a	highly	significant	feature	of	our	actual	candidates	for	the	fundamental	laws	that	they	are	applicable	to	partial	models.	Partial	models	specify	physical	situations	in	an	incomplete	and	coarse-grained	way,	which	is	crucial	for	allowing	us	to	know	when	the	relevant	models	hold	true	of	real	life	situations.	So,	laws	that	promote	(approximately)	true	predictions	based	on	partial	models	need	to	license	derivations	from	incomplete	information.	And,	as	illustrated	above,	this	condition	is	a	defining	feature	of	laws	that	satisfy	CU.	Hence,	the	same	laws	that	are	easily	applicable	to	partial	models	also	satisfy	CU.	The	centrality	of	partial	models	to	physical	practice	then	shows	that	physics	requires	laws	that	are	cognitively	useful	in	the	sense	of	CU.	We	conclude	that	physical	practice	provides	strong	evidence	for	CU.	(There	are	several	other	features,	in	addition	to	error-tolerance	and	allowing	the	use	of	partial	models,	that	make	actual	candidates	for	the	laws	cognitively	useful	for	us.	Let	us	briefly	mention	a	few	more:	First,	the	laws	exhibit	striking	symmetries.	If	the	laws	varied	widely	depending	on	where	and	when	scientists	perform	experiments	or	on	how	the	target	system	is	spatially	oriented,	they	would	be	virtually	useless	for	us.	Second,	non-classical	laws	(e.g.,	the	laws	of	Special	Relativity)	often	allow	the	use	of	(mathematically)	much	simpler	classical	laws	(e.g.,	Newton’s	laws	of	mechanics)	as	‘limiting	cases’.	Third,	our	best	candidates	for	the	laws	are	Markovian	such	that	we	can	predict	what	happens	to	systems	from	the	state	of	the	world	at	a	slightly	earlier	time	without	having	to	consider	what	happened	(for	instance)	in	the	distant	past	and	usually	allow	predictions	from	‘spatially	local’	information.	And,	fourth,	the	actual	candidates	for	the	laws	all	are	expressed	by	computable	functions	(see	Deutsch	2012)).	In	the	rest	of	this	section,	we	will	address	two	possible	worries.	A	first	worry	about	CU	is	the	resulting	anthropocentricity.	CU	entails	that	the	standards	for	lawhood	implicit	in	science	are	ultimately	rooted	in	our	situation	as	limited	beings.	Lewis	called	the	worry	that	the	laws	according	to	the	Humean	BSA	are	objectionably	anthropocentric	the	“problem	of	the	ratbag	idealist”	(see	Lewis	1994:	476	and	Hall	2015:	267–269).	Note	that	CU	does	not	imply	that	what	the	laws	say	about	the	world	is	relative	to	our	cognitive	capacities.	For	example,	if	Newton’s	equations	come	out	as	laws,	then	the	fact	that	particles	behave	in	accordance	with	Newton’s	equations	is	a	truth	about	the	Humean	mosaic	that	is	in	no	way	relative	to	our	cognitive	capacities	(cf.	Cohen	and	Callender	2009:	30).	CU,	however,	does	entail	that	which	facts	about	the	Humean	mosaic	have	the	status	of	laws	is	partly	explained	by	our	cognitive	capacities.	And	which	
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facts	are	laws,	according	to	Humean	reductionism,	then	helps	determine	the	world’s	counterfactual,	causal,	and	dispositional	structure.		In	reply,	we	argue	that	CU’s	anthropocentricity	is	not	objectionable.	First,	the	standards	of	lawhood	according	to	our	view	are	non-voluntary	and	robust.	The	only	fact	about	us	that	matters	to	what	the	laws	are	is	that	we	have	limitations	with	regard	to	gathering	and	processing	information.	These	limitations	are	independent	of	what	we	believe	or	desire.	So,	the	laws	are	in	no	way	‘up	to	us’.	Moreover,	these	limitations	are	shared	by	all	agents	we	know	and	are	not	likely	to	change	over	time.	While	technology	may	improve	significantly,	there	will	still	be	limitations	on	how	much	we	know	and	can	process.	Our	view	can	then	explain	how	the	scientific	community	can	disagree	about	what	the	laws	are	and	make	progress.	There	can	be	objective	disagreement	about	what	information	is	most	cognitively	useful	for	limited	beings.	And	yet	to	be	discovered	best	systems	may	be	cognitively	much	more	useful	for	limited	creatures	than	any	current	candidates	for	the	fundamental	laws.14	Second,	the	resulting	anthropocentricity	nicely	accounts	for	certain	features	of	scientific	practice.	We	have	shown	above	that	many	de	facto	features	of	laws,	such	as	error-tolerance	or	applicability	to	partial	models,	are	to	be	expected	if	science	aims	for	laws	that	are	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	So,	our	account	explains	why	our	best	candidates	for	laws	have	these	features.	By	contrast,	non-anthropocentric	theories	that	construe	laws	as	independent	of	the	capacities	of	creatures	like	us	appear	to	have	no	explanation	for	why	the	laws	have	these	and	other	remarkable	features	that	make	them	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	Third,	Humean	reductionism	is	more	plausible	as	a	result	of	being	anthropocentric	(cf.	Loewer	2007:	325).	Its	limited	anthropocentricity	allows	Humeans	to	make	do	with	a	very	sparse	ontology	because	no	extra	metaphysical	structure	is	needed	to	distinguish	laws	from	non-laws.	Bringing	in	our	situation	as	agents	nicely	explains	why	certain	facts	about	the	world	are	of	distinctive	interest	to	our	inquiry	but	not	others.	By	contrast,	theories	maintaining	that	the	standards	for	lawhood	are	completely	independent	of	our	situations	as	cognizers	inevitably	need	to	posit	additional	ontological	or	ideological	machinery	that	singles	out	the	laws.	Letting	our	
                                               14	What	if	there	are	alien	scientists	who,	like	Gods	or	Laplacean	demons,	can	know	the	world’s	state	with	complete	precision	and	have	no	limitations	in	their	processing	power?	We	contend	that	these	agents,	if	they	have	a	concept	of	a	law	of	nature	at	all,	would	have	a	different	concept	from	ours	such	that	our	laws	would	not	be	of	particular	interest	to	them.	
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make-up	as	cognizers	do	this	work	dispenses	with	this	machinery	and	has	the	additional	benefit	of	making	immediately	clear	why	we	care	about	the	distinction	between	laws	and	non-laws.15	In	light	of	these	three	points,	the	anthropocentricity	arising	from	making	best	systems	best	for	us	is	not	objectionable.		The	second	worry	is	that	CU	may	be	at	odds	with	certain	prime	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws.	In	particular,	you	may	think	that	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	do	not	seem	geared	toward	being	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	After	all,	the	interpretation	of	these	laws	is	notoriously	tricky	and	we	can	at	best	derive	probabilistic	predictions	from	them.	So,	you	may	worry	that	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	would,	according	to	CU,	not	be	good	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws.		 In	reply,	we	argue	that	science’s	preference	for	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	is	fully	in	accordance	with	CU.	First,	quantum	mechanics’	core	formalism,	consisting	of	the	quantum	state,	the	Schrödinger	equation	and	the	Born	rule,	allows	us	to	derive	a	large	number	of	predictions	from	incomplete	information.	Quantum	mechanics	is	our	empirically	best	confirmed	theory	in	the	history	of	science.	So,	actual	limited	scientists	have	derived	more	accurate	predictions	from	it	than	from	any	other	theory.	Indeed,	quantum	mechanics	has	features	similar	to	the	features	that	make	classical	mechanics	useful	for	limited	beings.	Macroscopic	systems	can	often	be	treated	as	relatively	isolated	from	their	surroundings	even	in	cases	where	locality	is	violated	due	to	quantum	entanglement	(see	Elga	2007:	109,	fn.	7).	And,	moreover,	quantum	mechanics	allows	us	to	make	predictions	even	when	we	are	ignorant	of	the	exact	microstate	of	the	relevant	system.	We	can	often,	at	least	in	practice,	derive	the	approximately	correct	predictions	about	macroscopic	systems	in	terms	of	higher-level	dynamics	that	allows	us	to	ignore	various	aspects	of	the	relevant	systems	(see	Wallace	forthcoming:	§10).16	Second,	that	science	aims	for	laws	that	are	cognitively	useful	does	not	mean	that	the	resulting	laws	will	be	perfectly	tailored	to	our	cognitive	needs.	Nature,	after	all,	needs	to	cooperate	too.	We	can	imagine	candidates	for	the	fundamental	physical	laws	that	would	be	more	useful	for	limited	creatures	than	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics.	
                                               15	Lewis’s	effort	to	make	his	version	of	the	BSA	non-anthropocentric,	by	contrast,	comes	at	the	cost	of	positing	perfectly	natural	properties	(Lewis	1983:	367–368)	and	objective	standards	of	strength	and	simplicity	(Lewis	1994:	479).	However,	it	is	then	not	clear	that	scientists	should	accommodate	this	structure	when	discovering	laws.	See	Cohen	and	Callender	(2009:	sec.	2.1)	and	van	Fraassen	(1990:	53)	for	criticisms	along	these	lines.	16	Thanks	to	David	Glick	for	discussion	of	this	point.	
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For	example,	laws	that	are	completely	deterministic.	(In	quantum	mechanics,	the	Schrödinger	equation	is	deterministic,	but	it	is	hard	to	derive	predictions	from	it	without	the	Born	rule,	which	only	yields	probabilities	of	measurement	outcomes.)	But	we	also	want	laws	that	allow	us	to	make	as	many	predictions	as	possible.	And	quantum	mechanics,	given	the	abundance	and	accuracy	of	its	predictions,	is	the	most	cognitively	useful	theory	we	currently	have.	So,	the	success	of	quantum	mechanics	is	fully	compatible	with	the	truth	of	CU.		
4	Why	best	for	us	is	best	In	this	section,	we	will	argue	that	incorporating	CU	into	the	BSA	enables	a	reply	to	Hall’s	challenge	because	it	provides	a	Humean	motivation	for	why	the	laws	display	modal	latitude.	A	central	feature	of	cognitively	useful	laws	is	their	robust	applicability.	Cognitively	useful	laws	allow	the	derivation	of	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	and	even	inaccurate	information.	So,	these	laws	are	robust	with	respect	to	how	complete	and	accurate	information	about	systems	needs	to	be	to	facilitate	the	derivation	of	(approximate)	truths.	This	robustness	allows	creatures	like	us	to	apply	the	laws	to	actual	physical	systems	because	our	knowledge	of	these	systems	and	their	environment	is	always	incomplete	and	often	slightly	inaccurate.			 Modal	latitude	is	a	byproduct	of	robust	applicability.	Think	about	what	is	involved	in	using	the	laws	for	making	inferences	from	incomplete	and	inaccurate	information.	There	are	two	general	options:	First,	you	can	apply	the	laws	to	a	partial	model	of	the	system	that	leaves	out	features	about	which	you	lack	precise	information.	For	example,	we	may	make	predictions	about	a	collision	between	two	proton	beams	from	a	model	that	omits	various	distant	objects.	This	partial	model	then	represents	non-actual	circumstances	in	which	there	are	no	such	distant	objects.	Second,	you	can	specify	precise	values	for	all	physical	parameters	and	then	apply	the	laws	to	the	so-specified	model.	But	since	we	are	almost	surely	mistaken	about	the	exact	values	of	many	parameters,	this	model	will	also	almost	surely	represent	non-actual	circumstances.	You	might	also	use	a	‘mixed	approach’	where	you	leave	out	some	facts	and	represent	others	somewhat	inaccurately.	Either	way,	making	inferences	from	such	information	requires	applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	circumstances.	Laws	that	are	only	applicable	to	the	actual	situation	are	useless	when	you	lack	precise	knowledge	of	the	relevant	actual	
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circumstances.	So,	modal	latitude	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	laws’	allowing	inferences	from	incomplete	or	slightly	inaccurate	information.		 Applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	circumstances	in	this	way	is	purely	in	the	service	of	making	(approximately)	true	predictions	about	actual	systems.	If	the	laws	are	cognitively	useful,	then	we	often	can	make	(at	least	approximately)	true	predictions	about	actual	systems	by	applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	circumstances.	For	example,	Elga	(2007)	points	out	that,	according	to	our	actual	candidates	for	the	laws,	the	forces	exerted	by	many	distant	objects	typically	do	not	matter	to	the	macroscopic	behavior	of	systems.	So,	we	can	derive	approximately	true	predictions	about	the	actual	behavior	of	macroscopic	objects	by	applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	circumstances	in	which	these	distant	objects	are	absent.		Moreover,	applying	the	laws	to	a	range	of	non-actual	circumstances	tells	us	what	we	can	neglect	when	making	predictions	about	actual	systems.	Suppose	you	apply	the	laws	to	a	range	of	situations	that	differ	with	respect	to	the	exact	masses	of	distant	objects.	If	certain	predictions	follow	given	all	(or	at	least	most)	mass	values,	then	you	can	be	reasonably	sure	that	the	exact	masses	of	distant	objects	do	not	matter	for	these	predictions.	This	procedure,	however,	presupposes	that	the	laws	are	applicable	to	non-actual	circumstances	in	the	first	place.	Similarly,	our	best	candidates	for	the	physical	laws	are	‘error	tolerant’	in	the	sense	that	small	mistakes	in	the	data	often	only	lead	to	small	mistakes	in	the	solutions	(see	§3).	So,	we	can	derive	(approximately)	true	predictions	about	actual	systems	by	applying	the	laws	to	slightly	inaccurate	models.			 According	to	our	Humean	account,	modal	latitude	is	a	byproduct	of	the	laws	allowing	us	to	infer	(approximate)	truths	given	our	epistemic	situation	as	limited	creatures.	Humean	best	systems	that	narrow	down	the	range	of	possible	initial	conditions	to	a	too	small	set	of	non-actual	scenarios	are	deficient	not	because	they	ignore	some	genuine	modal	aspect	of	fundamental	reality.	They	are	deficient	because	they	prevent	us	from	using	the	laws	for	making	inferences	about	actual	systems	from	incomplete	or	inaccurate	information	and	so	are	cognitively	useless.	Applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	scenarios	thus	serves	the	arch-Humean	aim	of	collecting	information	about	the	actual	non-modal	Humean	mosaic.		Our	perceptual	faculties	are	limited	such	that	we	can	never	know	the	state	of	the	world	at	a	given	time	with	complete	precision.	So,	we	cannot	rule	out	the	epistemic	
possibility	that	certain	non-actual	circumstances	obtain.	The	laws	then	need	to	allow	
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these	epistemic	possibilities	as	nomological	possibilities	in	order	to	allow	us	to	infer	(approximate)	truths	about	the	state	of	the	world	at	other	times	from	our	available	evidence.	So,	information	the	laws	tell	us	about	what	would	have	happened	if	non-actual	circumstances	had	obtained	is	not	sui	generis.	It	is	information	about	the	actual	mosaic	that	allows	us	to	make	inferences	from	fragmentary	inputs.	Thus,	according	to	our	account,	the	laws’	modal	content	is	ultimately	due	to	our	epistemic	ignorance.	A	nice	illustration	of	how	our	Humean	account	explains	the	modal	latitude	of	laws	is	the	resulting	story	of	why	functional	laws,	such	as	Newton’s	second	law,	range	over	values	that	are	plausibly	never	instantiated	in	the	actual	world.	By	Humean	lights,	it	seems	puzzling	why	science	prefers	laws	that	have	such	excessive,	apparently	modal	content	over	laws	that	range	only	over	values	that	are	actually	instantiated.	What	Humean	reasons	are	there	for	preferring	laws	that	cover	uninstantiated	values?		A	traditional	answer	is	that	unrestricted	laws	are	simpler	because	excluding	uninstantiated	values	would	prevent	us	from	writing	down,	e.g.,	Newton’s	second	law	as	a	simple	equation	(see	Armstrong	1983:	22–23).	We	think	that	there	is	something	right	about	this	response	because	simpler	laws	are	easier	to	use	in	calculations	and	so	are	more	cognitively	useful.	But	our	need	to	use	laws	for	making	inferences	given	incomplete	and	inaccurate	information	provides	two	new	reasons	for	preferring	laws	that	cover	uninstantiated	instances.		First,	due	to	measurement	errors,	we	are	often	mistaken	about	the	exact	values	of	observed	quantities.	Since	many	laws	are	such	that	small	mistakes	in	the	data	often	only	create	small	mistakes	in	the	solution,	we	still	can	derive	useful	predictions	from	such	inaccurate	data	by	applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	values.	And,	second,	we	often	know	only	the	approximate	values	of	certain	physical	quantities.	It	is	then	enormously	useful	if	we	can	apply	the	laws	to	a	wide	range	of	precise	values	that	are	all	compatible	with	our	epistemic	state.	If	certain	predictions	hold	true	for	all	or	most	of	these	epistemically	possible	values,	then	we	can	be	reasonably	confident	that	they	are	true	for	the	actual	system.17	In	this	and	the	previous	case,	it	is	enormously	useful	that	the	laws	cover	uninstantiated	instances	because	it	allows	us	to	make	approximately	true	predictions	given	incomplete	or	inaccurate	data.		We	have	shown	how	Humeans	have	an	account	for	why	laws	apply	to	non-actual	circumstances.	But	there	is	still	a	question	of	why	scientific	laws	apply	to	the	range	of	
                                               17	Thanks	to	Mike	Hicks	for	discussion	of	this	point.	See	also	our	discussion	of	Elga	in	§3.	
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non-actual	circumstances	to	which	they	in	fact	apply.	Why	does	physics	regard	some	circumstances	as	nomologically	possible	but	not	others?	This	question	is	equivalent	to	the	question	of	why	science	treats	certain	facts	as	laws,	such	that	they	hold	in	all	nomologically	possible	worlds,	but	treats	other	facts	as	mere	boundary	conditions.	A	Humean	theory	needs	to	explain	why,	for	example,	facts	like	Hall’s	phony	constant	are	not	serious	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.		CU	explains	why	Hall’s	phony	fundamental	constant	is	not	a	candidate	for	a	law	of	nature	because	it	is	not	part	of	best	systems	that	maximize	cognitive	usefulness.	The	phony	constant	is	a	single	real	number	that	encodes	the	entire	state	of	the	universe	at	an	instant.	It	is	created	by	interleaving	the	exact	numerical	values	of	the	coordinates,	masses,	and	charges	of	every	single	particle	at	that	instant.	Limited	beings	cannot	grasp	the	exact	value	of	the	constant.	However,	grasping	the	phony	constant	only	approximately	does	not	help	you	to	make	any	predictions,	since	that	does	not	mean	that	you	will	know	the	approximate	positions,	masses,	and	charges	of	all	particles	(Hall	2015:	273–274	attributes	this	response	to	Barry	Loewer).	Here	is	a	brief	illustration	of	this	last	claim:	Suppose	you	have	a	list	of	the	exact	values	of	the	masses,	charges,	and	spatial	coordinates	of	every	single	particle	in	the	universe	at	an	instant	t.	A	natural	way	of	encoding	all	of	this	information	into	a	single	real	number	is	by	interleaving	for	every	single	particle	its	mass-value,	its	charge-value	and	the	values	of	the	spatial	coordinates	into	a	single	number.	Then	you	take	all	of	the	resulting	numbers	and	interleave	them	again	to	get	a	single	number,	which	now	encodes	the	complete	state	of	the	universe	at	t.	If	you	know	only	the	first	thousand	digits	of	this	number,	all	you	know	is	the	first	digit	of,	say,	the	mass-value	of	each	of	a	thousand	particles.	This	information	hardly	helps	you	make	any	interesting	predictions.	This	feature	distinguishes	the	phony	constant	from	legitimate	constants,	such	as	the	gravitational	constant	G.	Plugging	an	approximate	value	for	G	into	the	gravitational	law	is	good	enough	to	determine	the	gravitational	forces	between	any	two	masses	at	least	approximately.	So,	in	contrast	to	the	phony	constant,	G	contributes	to	cognitive	usefulness	of	the	laws	because	even	its	approximate	value	is	very	useful	for	making	predictions.	And	even	for	a	creature	with	enormous	computational	powers,	who	could	store	and	process	the	exact	phony	constant,	the	maximal	strength	that	deterministic	laws	including	the	phony	constant	provide	would	come	at	the	cost	of	extreme	inefficiency.	
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For	instance,	a	rock’s	rough	macroscopic	evolution	can	be	predicted	from	coarse-grained	information	about	it	and	a	small	number	of	its	background	conditions.	If	this	evolution	is	instead	derived	from	the	dynamical	laws	and	the	phony	constant,	the	agent	needs	to	process	all	the	extra	information	stored	in	the	phony	constant	that	is	not	necessary	to	make	the	prediction	at	hand.		 Worse,	if	we	cannot	process	the	exact	value	of	the	phony	constant,	then	adding	it	to	a	set	of	deterministic	dynamical	laws	might	even	drastically	decrease	the	predictions	a	limited	creature	can	make.	The	constant,	in	combination	with	deterministic	laws,	narrows	down	the	range	of	possible	initial	conditions	to	just	the	actual	ones	(as	illustrated	above).	Thus,	the	resulting	set	of	laws	would	not	be	applicable	to	partial	and	slightly	erroneous	models.	These	models	represent	different	initial	conditions	from	the	one	of	the	actual	universe,	and	so	they	are	ruled	out	as	nomologically	impossible	by	the	phony	constant	in	combination	with	deterministic	laws.	But	a	set	of	laws	that	we	cannot	use	to	make	inferences	from	incomplete	information	is	virtually	useless	for	creatures	like	us.		Making	best	systems	best	for	us	rules	out	other	implausible	candidates	for	laws	of	nature	in	a	similar	way.18	Hall	objects	that	many	facts	that	would	be	enormously	useful	to	know	are	still	not	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws.	For	instance,			cosmologists	would	very	much	like	to	know	the	total	mass	of	the	universe	–	and	[...]	even	approximate	information	about	this	mass	would	be	enormously	predictively	and	explanatorily	valuable.	But	would	their	ability	to	squeeze	useful	predictive	and	explanatory	information	out	of	this	knowledge	do	anything	to	show	that	facts	about	the	total	mass	should	be	viewed	as	nomologically	necessary?	(Hall	2015:	274)			It	seems	that	even	knowing	only	the	approximate	total	mass	of	the	universe	might	be	extremely	useful	for	deriving	certain	predictions.	A	theory	of	laws	of	nature	should	explain	why	the	mass	of	the	universe	is	still	not	a	candidate	for	a	law.		
                                               18	CU	also	solves	a	famous	problem	for	Lewis’s	version	of	the	BSA.	Take	a	maximally	strong	system	S	and	“[l]et	F	be	a	predicate	that	applies	to	all	and	only	things	at	worlds	where	S	holds.	Take	F	as	primitive,	and	axiomatize	S	(or	an	equivalent	thereof)	by	the	single	axiom	∀x	Fx”	(Lewis	1983:	367).	Since	∀x	Fx	is	maximally	informative	and	simple,	Lewis’s	BSA	has	the	absurd	consequence	that	all	regularities	whatsoever	come	out	as	laws.	Lewis	evades	this	problem	by	restricting	predicates	to	ones	referring	to	perfectly	natural	properties.	Our	account	requires	no	such	objective	joints,	since	∀x	Fx	does	not	provide	information	that	is	storable	or	computable	by	resource-bounded	creatures	and	so	is	cognitively	useless.	Our	account,	thus,	incorporates	the	central	insight	of	the	so-called	‘Better	Best	System	Account’,	viz.,	that	Humeans	need	not	(and	should	not)	posit	a	naturalness	constraint	on	the	language	the	best	system	is	couched	in	(see	Cohen	and	Callender	2009).	
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	 In	reply,	we	argue	that	including	the	mass	of	the	universe	in	a	best	system	would	decrease	its	cognitive	usefulness.	As	Hall	points	out,	knowing	the	mass	of	the	universe	is	very	valuable	for	certain	predictions.	For	example,	it	might	be	useful	for	deriving	whether	the	universe	will	expand	forever	or	end	up	in	a	big	crunch.	However,	suppose	you	want	to	know	how	a	rock	on	your	desk	evolves	over	the	next	two	minutes;	whether	a	certain	bridge	will	survive	an	upcoming	storm;	or	what	happens	when	two	proton	beams	meet	in	the	Large	Hadron	Collider.	To	solve	these	and	similar	problems,	it	is	not	necessary	to	know	even	the	approximate	mass	of	the	universe.	Consequently,	the	mass	of	the	universe	would	add	information	to	the	laws	that	is	completely	irrelevant	for	most	(approximate)	truths	we	derive	from	the	laws.	Thus,	the	rather	minimal	increase	of	predictions	that	adding	the	mass	of	the	universe	adds	to	the	laws	provides	comes	at	the	price	of	decreasing	their	efficiency	significantly.	So,	it	is	more	useful	to	treat	the	mass	of	the	universe	as	an	auxiliary	hypothesis	that	is	called	on	when	needed	rather	than	to	add	it	to	your	laws.19	(Notice	that	a	system	that	balances	strength	and	simplicity	as	Lewis	understands	them	may	rule	out	the	phony	constant	for	similar	reasons.)		 A	similar	worry	about	our	account	concerns	why	our	best	candidates	for	laws	of	nature	allow	possible	initial	conditions	where	creatures	like	us	do	not	exist,	for	example	where	there	is	no	life	in	the	universe.	If	the	laws	are	tailored	toward	helping	creature	like	us	navigate	the	world,	why	should	they	be	applicable	to	situations	that	exclude	the	existence	of	such	creatures?	We	reply	that	adding	conditions	that	ensure	the	existence	of	creatures	like	us	to	the	laws	would	add	extra	information	to	the	laws	that	are	irrelevant	for	most	predictions.	For	example,	when	we	want	to	predict	the	evolution	of	a	rock,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	universe	contains	life	or	not.	Moreover,	if	we	want	to	use	the	laws	to	make	predictions	from	the	kind	of	evidence	creatures	like	us	have,	then	it	would	be	redundant	to	build	into	the	laws	that	creatures	like	us	exist.	Our	having	of	the	evidence	already	entails	that	there	is	life	in	the	universe.	
                                               19	You	may	worry	that	the	above	considerations	also	rule	out	certain	bona	fide	laws.	Suppose	(as	may	well	be	the	case)	that	weak	nuclear	force	is	completely	irrelevant	to	most	of	the	approximate	truths	that	we	derive	from	the	laws.	Why	then	should	there	be	a	force	law	for	that	force?	What	is	the	difference	between	that	force	law	and	a	fact	about	the	approximate	mass	of	the	universe?	In	reply,	we	argue	that	we	still	would	need	a	force	law	to	tell	us	that	weak	nuclear	force	can	be	ignored	in	almost	all	situations.	With	regard	to	the	approximate	mass	of	the	universe,	the	gravitational	laws	tell	us	that	we	can	ignore	it	in	most	cases.	But	without	a	law	for	weak	nuclear	force,	we	would	have	no	idea	whether	in	any	given	situation,	we	could	ignore	weak	nuclear	force	or	have	to	take	it	into	account	after	all.		
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CU	also	explains	why	facts	that	decrease	the	modal	latitude	of	the	laws	(by	making	them	apply	to	fewer	non-actual	circumstances)	sometimes	can	be	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.	For	example,	Albert	(2015)	proposes	adding	two	additional	fundamental	laws	to	our	best	physical	theories:	the	“past	hypothesis,”	which	says	that	“the	universe	had	some	particular,	simple,	compact,	symmetric,	cosmologically	sensible,	very	low-entropy	initial	macrocondition”	(Albert	2015:	5).	And	the	“statistical	postulate,”	which	specifies	a	uniform	probability	distribution	over	the	microstates	compatible	with	the	past	hypothesis	(Albert	2015:	5).	Regarding	the	past	hypothesis	as	a	fundamental	physical	law	reduces	the	modal	latitude	of	the	laws	because	it	rules	out	possible	initial	conditions	where	the	universe	started	in	a	different	macrocondition	than	its	actual,	low-entropy	one.	 	CU	explains	why	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	may	be	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.20	According	to	our	account,	science	aims	for	modal	latitude	only	to	the	extent	that	doing	so	facilitates	inferring	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	or	inaccurate	information	about	systems.	If	applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	circumstances	is	not	useful	for	this	purpose,	it	is	no	longer	a	virtue	for	the	laws	to	cover	these	circumstances.	Now,	adding	the	past	hypothesis	to	the	laws	rules	out	initial	conditions	where,	for	example,	the	universe	started	in	a	high-entropy	macrostate.	Covering	these	possible	initial	conditions,	however,	is	not	required	to	make	the	laws	applicable	to	the	incomplete	or	slightly	inaccurate	models	that	we	typically	use	for	predictions.	These	models	are	plausibly	still	compatible	with	the	initial	macrocondition	of	the	actual	universe,	and	so	the	past	hypothesis	does	not	get	in	the	way	of	allowing	us	to	derive	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	or	inaccurate	information.		 If	Albert	is	right,	then	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	are	in	fact	required	to	derive	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	information.	Dynamical	laws	alone,	even	deterministic	ones,	are	not	enough	if	you	do	not	know	a	system’s	state	with	complete	precision.	All	plausible	candidates	for	the	dynamical	laws	allow,	given	only	a	macroscopic	description	of	a	system,	multiple	different	behaviors,	many	of	which	would	strike	us	as	bizarre.	For	example,	if	you	consider	a	rock	governed	by	the	Newtonian	laws	of	motion,	then	nothing	“is	going	to	stand	in	the	way	of	that	rock’s	suddenly	ejecting	one	of	its	trillions	of	elementary	particulate	constituents	at	enormous	speed	
                                               20	We	suspect	that	something	similar	applies	to	other	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws	that	decrease	modal	latitude,	such	as	force	laws	and	other	laws	of	coexistence.	
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and	careening	off	in	an	altogether	different	direction,	or	(for	that	matter)	spontaneously	disassembling	itself	into	statuettes	of	the	British	royal	family,	or	(come	to	think	of	it)	reciting	the	Gettysburg	Address”	(Albert	2015:	1).	So,	deriving	any	approximately	true	predictions	from	incomplete	information	requires	a	probability	distribution	over	microstates	that	makes	sure	that	such	bizarre	behaviors	have	negligibly	small	probabilities	(cf.	Ismael	2009:	91–92).	(Note	that	such	a	probability	distribution	is	also	relevant	for	why	we	can	largely	ignore	distant	influences	when	making	predictions	about	the	macroscopic	behavior	of	systems.	See	our	discussion	of	Elga	in	§3).		Albert	argues	that	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	specify	the	needed	probability	distribution	in	a	very	simple	way.	If	Albert	is	right	about	this	role,	then	adding	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	to	our	laws	dramatically	increases	the	laws’	cognitive	usefulness	because	it	is	necessary	for	efficiently	deriving	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	information.21	This	radical	increase	in	the	number	of	predictions	one	can	make	from	incomplete	information	would	then	plausibly	outweigh	the	added	complexity.	This	role	distinguishes	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	from,	e.g.,	the	mass	of	the	universe.	While	knowing	the	mass	of	the	universe	is	occasionally	required	for	deriving	certain	(approximate)	truths,	the	former	facts,	if	Albert	is	right,	are	relevant	whenever	we	derive	any	(approximate)	truths	from	mere	macroscopic	information	about	a	system.		That	facts	like	the	past	hypothesis	are	candidates	for	laws	of	nature	is	evidence	that	science	does	not	aim	unconditionally	at	a	strong	DH	and	a	weak	ICH	in	Hall’s	sense.	Recall	that	the	ICH	measures	how	many	possible	initial	conditions	a	set	of	laws	allow	and	the	DH	measures	how	many	possible	ways	there	are	for	the	world	to	evolve	given	specified	initial	conditions.	Adding	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	to	deterministic	dynamical	laws	does	not	strengthen	their	DH.	So,	deterministic	laws	already	have	as	strong	a	DH	as	laws	can	possibly	have.		But	adding	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	does	strengthen	the	ICH	because	it	rules	out	metaphysically	possible	initial	conditions	that	are	allowed	otherwise.	Focusing	on	cognitive	usefulness	explains	why	we	still	consider	these	facts	as	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.	Allowing	a	certain	range	of	possible	initial	conditions	is	
                                               21	This	“if,”	however,	is	a	big	“if.”	It	is	controversial	both	whether	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	really	provide	the	required	information	and	whether	they	do	so	in	the	most	efficient	way.	See	Albert	(2015:	6,	fn.	2)	and	Callender	(2011)	plus	the	references	therein	for	discussion.		
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useful	because	it	allows	us	to	apply	the	laws	to	system	of	which	we	have	incomplete	or	inaccurate	information.	But	ruling	out	other	initial	conditions	can	also	be	useful	if	it	allows	us	to	ignore	certain	dynamically	possible	behaviors	when	making	inferences	from	incomplete	information.	Playing	this	latter	role	makes	the	past	hypothesis	(in	conjunction	with	the	statistical	postulate)	a	candidate	for	a	law	of	nature	despite	decreasing	modal	latitude.		Summing	up	the	results	from	the	previous	two	sections,	our	version	of	the	BSA	has	the	following	three	benefits:	First,	it	is	in	accordance	with	scientific	practice	because	actual	candidates	for	the	laws	of	nature	have	features	that	make	them	enormously	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	Second,	it	provides	a	Humean	motivation	for	why	scientific	practice	aims	for	laws	that	cover	a	range	of	non-actual	circumstances.	And	third,	it	explains	why	certain	restrictions	on	the	initial	conditions	(such	as	the	past	hypothesis)	are	candidates	for	scientific	laws	while	others	(such	as	the	phony	constant)	are	not.		
5	Other	Humean	accounts	of	modal	latitude	In	the	remainder	of	the	paper,	we	want	to	contrast	our	account	with	other	recent	Humean	accounts	that	also	emphasize	the	laws'	usefulness	for	limited	beings.	The	guiding	idea	of	Hicks's	(forthcoming)	“Epistemic	Role	Account”	is	that	the	laws	are	those	facts	that	are	constant	between	subsystems.	Hicks	emphasizes	that	the	laws	of	nature	need	to	be	discoverable	and	confirmable	by	limited	beings.	Limited	beings	lack	access	to	the	state	of	the	universe	as	a	whole,	and	so	laws	that	are	confirmable	by	limited	beings	need	to	apply	to	subsystems.	The	rough	idea	is	that	if	we	consider	some	actual	subsystem,	such	as	our	solar	system,	and	treat	it	as	if	it	is	completely	isolated	from	its	environment,	then	the	laws	should	describe	that	system	approximately	correctly.	Moreover,	the	laws	are	easier	to	confirm	if	they	apply	to	as	many	actual	subsystems	as	possible	in	this	way	and	if	they	make	many	accurate	predictions	about	each	system.22			 Hicks’s	proposal	is	similar	to	our	account	because	it	plausibly	is	part	of	the	laws’	cognitive	usefulness	that	limited	beings	can	find	out	about	them	and	confirm	them.	Hicks	is	less	concerned	than	we	are	with	providing	a	Humean	motivation	of	why	science	
                                               22	Hicks	calls	the	corresponding	constraints	“local	strength”	and	“breadth.”	He	proposes	other	interesting	constraints	on	laws,	but	these	are	not	relevant	for	the	discussion	at	hand.	
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entertains	the	standards	of	lawhood	it	in	fact	entertains.	His	main	goal	is	to	present	a	Humean	account	that	correctly	demarcates	the	laws	from	the	non-laws.	In	particular,	he	wants	to	explain	why	facts	such	as	Hall’s	phony	constant	are	not	laws	but	boundary	conditions.	Nonetheless,	Hicks’s	account	provides	a	Humean	motivation	for	the	laws’	modal	latitude.	Laws	that	are	easily	confirmable	by	creatures	like	us,	according	to	Hicks,	need	to	apply	to	many	different	subsystems	when	these	systems	are	treated	as	if	they	are	isolated.	And	since	subsystems	in	our	universe	are	never	in	fact	completely	isolated	from	their	environment,	the	relevant	circumstances	are	non-actual.	So,	Hicks’s	proposal	explains	why	Humean	laws	apply	to	non-actual	circumstances.		 Hicks’s	account,	however,	lacks	the	same	independent	motivation	as	our	account.	First,	making	predictions	about	many	actual	subsystems	is	at	most	necessary	for	the	laws’	cognitive	usefulness	but	not	sufficient.	Laws	that	satisfy	Hicks’s	requirements	may	still	not	allow	creatures	like	us	to	make	predictions.	Suppose	you	want	to	predict	the	future	evolution	of	a	rock	on	your	desk.	Hicks’s	restriction	on	laws	guarantees	that	the	laws	make	the	correct	predictions	for	as	many	subsystems	as	possible	if	these	systems	are	treated	as	if	they	were	isolated.	But	laws	that	satisfy	this	restriction	may	still	give	you	no	guidelines	for	knowing	whether	they	will	make	the	correct	predictions	about	this	particular	rock	if	you	treat	it	as	if	it	is	isolated.	Moreover,	even	if	the	laws	do	make	the	correct	predictions	about	the	rock	treated	as	if	it	is	isolated,	limited	creatures	may	not	be	able	to	derive	these	predictions.	Limited	beings	are	not	just	ignorant	of	the	rock’s	environment	but	also	of	its	exact	microstate.	So,	even	laws	that	make	the	correct	predictions	about	the	rock	if	it	is	treated	as	if	it	were	isolated	are	still	not	useful	for	creatures	like	us	if	they	require	as	input	its	exact	microstate.	Yet,	Hicks’s	restrictions	on	laws	by	themselves	do	not	entail	that	the	laws	allow	approximately	correct	predictions	from	partial	information	about	subsystems.	For	laws	to	be	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us,	the	laws	need	to	guide	us	with	regard	to	when	we	can	and	cannot	treat	subsystems	as	if	they	are	isolated	from	everything	else	and	still	get	the	approximately	correct	predictions.	For	example,	Newtonian	laws	tell	us	that	when	we	make	predictions	about	a	rock	on	Earth,	we	can	ignore	most	objects	in	its	surrounding.	However,	they	also	tell	us	when	we	cannot	ignore	them,	such	as	when	the	respective	objects	are	extremely	massive.	Moreover,	for	the	laws	to	allow	us	to	make	predictions	given	our	ignorance	of	the	rock’s	exact	microstate,	they	need	to	be	applicable	to	all	epistemically	possible	microstates	of	the	
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rock	and	tell	us	that	typical	such	microstates	have	the	same	macroscopic	evolution.	Only	given	this	information	are	we	justified	in	making	any	predictions.	So,	while	Hicks’s	account	incorporates	important	insights,	facts	that	satisfy	Hicks’s	requirements	may	still	not	be	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	Second,	a	more	technical	worry	about	Hicks’s	account	is	it	that	it	is	not	clear	whether	it	can	allow	non-dynamical	laws	that	would	restrict	the	boundary	condition	of	the	universe.	For	example,	the	past	hypothesis	specifies	that	the	early	universe	“had	some	particular,	simple,	compact,	symmetric,	cosmologically	sensible,	very	low-entropy initial	macrocondition”	(Albert	2015:	5).	If	the	past	hypothesis	is	a	law,	then	it	seems	to	drastically	reduce	the	number	of	subsystems	to	which	the	laws	apply.	This	law,	by	definition,	only	seems	to	apply	to	the	whole	universe	since	it	references	its	initial	macrostate.	And	even	if	it	could	somehow	be	adapted	to	smaller	systems,	it	will	not	be	true	of	many	of	them.	For	example,	many	subsystems	taken	by	itself,	such	as	a	gas	that	is	evenly	spread	out	in	a	box,	are	not	in	states	of	very	low	entropy.	So,	Hicks’s	account	rules	out	facts	such	as	Albert’s	past	hypothesis	as	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.	By	contrast,	our	Humean	account	of	laws	can	make	room	for	facts	like	the	past	hypothesis	as	candidates	for	laws	because	they	may	increase	the	laws’	cognitive	usefulness	for	limited	beings	(see	§4).		Another	recent	account	that	appeals	to	the	cognitive	usefulness	of	best	systems	is	Cohen	and	Callender’s	(2009)	“Better	Best	Systems	Account.”	Cohen	and	Callender	reject	Lewis’s	restriction	that	the	predicates	in	best	systems	need	to	refer	to	perfectly	natural	properties.	Instead,	they	allow	many	different	sets	of	predicates	and	propose	to	run	a	separate	bestness	competitions	to	determine	the	best	systems	relative	to	each	choice	of	predicates.	A	constraint	analogous	to	cognitive	usefulness	then	comes	in	because	when	faced	with	the	question	of	which	of	these	various	best	systems	to	choose,	they	appeal	to	our	“pragmatic/explanatory	goals	(rather	than	the	fixed	nature	of	the	universe)”	(Cohen	and	Callender	2009:	21).		But	Cohen	and	Callender	appeal	to	these	pragmatic	factors	only	with	regard	to	choosing	the	predicates	in	terms	of	which	best	systems	are	framed.	They	play	no	role	for	explaining	the	criteria	that	decide,	relative	to	any	choice	of	predicates,	which	system	is	best.	Our	above	argument,	however,	shows	that	appeal	to	practical	concerns,	in	the	form	of	what	information	is	useful	for	limited	agents,	is	already	needed	to	motivate	why	
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science	uses	the	standards	of	lawhood	it	in	fact	uses	and,	in	particular,	why	these	standards	favor	laws	with	modal	latitude.23		
6	Conclusion	We	have	spelled	out	an	important	challenge	for	Humean	reductionism	about	laws	of	nature	and	motivated	a	new	version	of	the	Humean	BSA	that	meets	this	challenge.	We	have	argued	that	the	best	way	of	understanding	the	BSA	is	by	acknowledging	that	the	laws	of	nature	are	tailored	toward	helping	limited	beings	make	predictions	from	information	accessible	to	them.	This	take	on	laws	of	nature	is	nicely	summarized	in	a	passage	by	Ernst	Mach	with	which	we	want	to	end	our	paper:		 In	our	view,	laws	of	nature	are	a	product	of	our	mental	need	to	find	our	way	about	in	nature	[...].	If	individual	findings	later	accumulate,	there	arises	a	powerful	urge	to	minimize	mental	effort,	to	attain	economy	[...].	The	progressive	refinement	of	laws	of	nature	[...]	corresponds	to	a	more	precise	adaption	of	thought	to	fact.	It	is	of	course	not	possible	to	achieve	perfect	adaptation	to	every	individual	and	incalculable	future	fact.	It	requires	abstraction,	simplification,	schematizing	and	idealization	of	the	facts,	if	the	laws	of	nature	are	to	become	applicable	[...]	to	actual	concrete	cases.	(Mach	1976:	354–355)		
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